Rafale fighter jet deal negotiations are entering a high-stakes endgame as French President Emmanuel Macron arrives in India with talks focused on a potential order of 114 Dassault Aviation Rafale fighters valued at about $35bn, according to the Financial Times. The scale would make it one of India’s largest-ever defence procurements, but the reporting also stresses the agreement is not yet signed: cabinet-level approval and the final commercial package remain open, and price talks could still push a decision beyond the visit.
What is on the table
The emerging package centres on 114 Rafale multirole fighters for the Indian Air Force, a number that would almost rival the total Rafales operated by France’s own armed forces. The Financial Times reported that India’s defence ministry has cleared the deal in principle, while cabinet approval is still awaited and the final price negotiation is unresolved.
Macron’s trip is also being framed as a broader strategic and industrial push. Alongside defence, Indian and French officials have placed technology cooperation on the agenda, including artificial intelligence discussions tied to a summit Macron is expected to attend during the visit.
Why this is an industrial policy story, not just geopolitics
A purchase on this scale is not only about adding aircraft to a depleted fighter fleet; it becomes a long-duration manufacturing and services programme. The biggest near-term consequence is that the centre of gravity shifts from the aircraft’s sticker price to the industrial terms: how much work is done in India, what technology transfer is allowed, how engines and avionics supply chains are structured, and who controls upgrades over a 30–40 year lifecycle.
Offsets and local production
Indian defence procurement typically pushes hard on local value addition, and reporting around the Rafale talks has highlighted the prospect of significant in-country production of parts and subsystems. If the structure follows prior Indian “Make in India” aims, it could include a split between a smaller batch delivered from France and a larger number assembled or manufactured in India through domestic partners. That matters because it dictates capex decisions for tooling, quality systems, and skilled labour, and it determines which Indian suppliers get long-term, exportable workshare versus one-off assembly.
The maintenance tail may be larger than the headline
For combat aircraft, the long-term contracts—maintenance, spares, training, simulators, mid-life upgrades, and weapons integration—can shape total programme economics as much as the acquisition itself. A 114-jet fleet would create decades of predictable demand for depot-level maintenance, repair and overhaul, and for supply-chain resilience in items that routinely bottleneck availability: engines, radar modules, electronic warfare components, and mission computers.
For India, that maintenance tail is the practical test of “strategic autonomy”: if jets are assembled locally but critical components remain foreign-controlled, operational readiness can still be hostage to external approvals and spares pipelines.
Winners, bottlenecks, and trade-offs
France and its defence industrial base
For Dassault, the Rafale fighter jet deal would be a major production pipeline that supports long lead-time planning, supplier investment, and workforce stability. It would also reinforce France’s pitch that it can offer a strategic partnership not tied to US export controls in the same way as some American platforms.
India’s capability gap and program risk
India’s air force has been managing a long-running shortfall relative to stated requirements. A large order is a capability fill, but it also introduces execution risk. The more the contract leans into local production, the more programme management shifts to industrial coordination: qualifying suppliers, meeting aerospace-grade tolerances, and ensuring that locally made parts do not slow the delivery schedule.
There is also the political and budget trade-off. A $35bn-class programme competes with other capital priorities, and the timeline from contract to squadron-ready capacity is measured in years, not months. The uncomfortable reality for planners is that an “approved” procurement still has to survive price talks, contracting mechanics, and parliamentary and cabinet processes.
What happens next
The Financial Times characterised the Rafale fighter jet deal as close but not final: cabinet sign-off and a settled price package are the gating items, and negotiations could extend beyond Macron’s trip. If a framework is agreed, the next phase would typically move quickly into detailed workshare and offset planning—decisions that determine where factories are expanded, which Indian firms become tier-one suppliers, and how self-sufficient India can actually be in sustaining the fleet.
The surprise for many readers is that the jets are only the visible tip of the programme. The real industrial story is the supply chain: who gets the high-value components, who owns upgrades, and whether “made in India” translates into readiness in Indian hangars when parts are scarce and politics gets complicated.